## AT: CMR CP

### 2AC – Net Ben – Don’t work

#### PPPs fail

Henrich Böll Stiftung, 11-19-2018, "History RePPPeated," The Green Political Foundation, https://www.boell.de/en/2018/12/11/history-repppeated-how-public-private-partnerships-are-failing///jc

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are increasingly being promoted as the solution to the shortfall in financing needed to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Economic infrastructure, such as railways, roads, airports and ports, but also key services such as health, education, water and electricity are being delivered through PPPs in both the global north and south. Although the involvement of the private sector in public service provision is not new, there is currently keen political interest in PPPs as an important way to leverage private finance. Donor governments and financial institutions, such as the World Bank Group (WBG) and other multilateral development banks (MDBs), have set up multiple initiatives to promote changes in national regulatory frameworks to allow for PPPs, as well as to provide advice and finance for PPP projects. Since 2004 there has been a rapid growth in the amount of money invested in PPPs in the developing world. Although the trend has been volatile since 2012, efforts by MDBs to leverage private finance in both emerging and low-income economies have continued — for example, through the “Cascade” approach developed by the WBG, whereby the use of private finance is prioritised over public or concessional finance. This indicates a more determined push to reduce the risk so private investors come in. Many projects have been procured as PPPs simply to circumvent budget constraints and to postpone the recording of fiscal costs. Some accounting practices allow governments to keep the cost of the project and its contingent liabilities “off balance sheet”. This ends up exposing public finances to excessive fiscal risks. Current austerity measures and orthodox policy prescriptions that encourage a low fiscal deficit also create a perverse incentive in favour of PPPs. This report gives an in-depth, evidence-based analysis of the impact of 10 PPP projects that have taken place across four continents, in both developed and developing countries. These case studies build on research conducted by civil society experts in recent years and have been written by the people who often work with and around the communities affected by these projects. The countries included are: Colombia, France, India, Indonesia, Lesotho, Liberia, Peru, Spain and Sweden. The sectors they cover are: education, energy, healthcare, transport, and water and sanitation. Although we do not intend to generalise our conclusions in the vast and complex universe of PPPs, these 10 cases illustrate the most common problems encountered by PPPs. Therefore, they challenge the capacity of PPPs to deliver results in the public interest. We found that: All 10 projects came with a high cost for the public purse, an excessive level of risk for the public sector and, therefore, a heavy burden for citizens. For example, the Queen Mamohato Hospital in Lesotho has had significant adverse and unpredictable financial consequences on public funds. Latest figures suggest that in 2016 the private partner Tsepong’s ‘invoiced’ fees amount to two times the “affordability threshold” set by the Government and the WB at the outset of the PPP. Contributing factors to cost escalation include flawed indexation of the annual fee paid by the government to Tsepong (unitary fee) and poor forecasting. In Sweden, the total construction cost of Nya Karolinska Solna (NKS) hospital has rocketed — from €1.4 billion to €2.4 billion — and has been beset by technical failures. It is now known as the “most expensive hospital in the world”. Every single PPP studied was riskier for the state than for the private companies involved, as the public sector was required to step in and assume the costs when things went wrong. A significant example is the case of Jakarta Water in Indonesia, where two PPP contracts resulted in significant losses for the public water utility, PAM Jaya. In 2011, it reported a financial loss of US$18 million. Estimates suggest that losses will eventually total US$2.4 billion if the cooperation agreement continues as planned until its expiry date in 2022. Five of the 10 PPPs reviewed impacted negatively on the poor, and contributed to an increase in the divide between rich and poor. For instance, in the case of the Queen Mamohato Hospital in Lesotho, the increasing and inflexible cost of the PPP hospital compromised necessary investment in primary and secondary healthcare in rural areas where mortality rates are rising and where three-quarters of the population live. In Jakarta, the provision of water through private operators (Jakarta Water) resulted in a radical increase in monthly bills, which are unaffordable for many poor families. Residents often rely on groundwater from community wedge wells, or have to buy water in jerry cans, which can cost as much as half a person’s daily income. Three of the PPPs resulted in serious social and environmental impacts. Poor planning and due diligence accounts for some of these. For example, on the Mundra coast in Gujarat, India, where a thermal power station project has taken place, there were serious social and environmental violations from the outset. Following flawed impact assessments, there has been a deterioration in water quality and fish populations; community health impacts are evident due to air emissions; access to fishing and drying sites has been blocked; forced displacement of fishermen has taken place. This has also impacted on the life of women. Girls in particular have also been pulled out of school to perform physical and domestic labour to survive. In Colombia, the PPP project designed to improve the navigability of the Magdalena River suffered from poor planning. Although the project never went into the construction phase — it collapsed due to the failure of the company to get the financing needed to implement it — the preliminary works carried out have already negatively affected the environment in and around the river. Nine out of 10 of the projects lacked transparency and/or failed to consult with affected communities, and undermined democratic accountability. The failure to publish contract details does not chime well with the risks that the public sector is forced to take on. In the small Indian town of Khadwa, for example, where a PPP was launched to provide municipal water, it took four years to finally inform the population about what was happening. More than 10,000 households filed objections against the project within a period of 30 days. This was in a town where regular domestic water connections totalled 15,000. In Liberia, where the government outsourced its public pre-primary and primary schools, initially to Bridge International Academies Ltd (BIA), the process was not competitive, local communities were not properly consulted, and there was not full transparency. All cases showed PPPs were complex to negotiate and implement, and that they required specific state capacities to negotiate in the public interest, including during the renegotiation process. In Peru, the renegotiation process to build a new airport through a PPP in Chinchero resulted in a change to the entire funding structure of the project. After a strong report from the Comptroller General referring to economic damages for the state, and in the midst of a national scandal over the project, the Peruvian government finally had to cancel the contract on the grounds of national interest. The construction of a courthouse in Paris proved so complex, costly and controversial that the new French Justice Minister has decided that her Ministry will never engage in a PPP again. Three of the PPP contracts had to be cancelled due to an evident failure in the process, including proper due diligence to identify the possible impacts of the project. For example, the Castor Project — feted as Spain’s biggest offshore gas storage plant — was halted after gas injections caused more than 1,000 earthquakes. Despite never being used, the Castor project has so far cost the public €3.28 billion, which is currently set to be paid through increased gas bills. This joint CSO report makes the following recommendations to the WBG, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other public development banks, together with the governments of wealthy countries that play a leading role in these institutions: Halt the aggressive promotion and incentivising of PPPs for social and economic infrastructure financing, and publicly recognise the financial and other significant risks that PPPs entail. Support countries in finding the best financing method for public services in social and economic infrastructure, which are responsible, transparent, environmentally and fiscally sustainable, and in line with their human rights obligations. Prioritise tax revenues, whilst augmenting them with long-term external, and domestic, concessional and non- concessional finance, where appropriate. Ensure good and democratic governance is in place before pursuing large-scale infrastructure or service developments. This should be done through informed consultation and broad civil society participation and monitoring, including by local communities, trade unions, and other stakeholders. Uphold the right to free, prior and informed consent, and ensure the right to redress for any affected communities. The rights of affected communities should be taken into account. Ensure that rigorous transparency standards apply, particularly with regard to accounting for public funds — the contract value of the PPP and its long-term fiscal implications must be included in national accounts. Contracts and performance reports of social and economic infrastructure projects should be proactively disclosed. The public interest ranks higher than commercial interests. Finally, we urge all those concerned with justice, equality, sustainability and human rights to resist the encroachment of PPPs and to push instead for high-quality, publicly-funded, democratically-controlled, accountable public services. The wellbeing of our communities and societies depends on it.

#### Aftershock of the pandemic ensures increased P3 failure

Financial Express, 7-11-2022, "Public-Private Partnership (PPP) project failures: Don’t put zombies on life-support," Financialexpress, https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/public-private-partnership-ppp-project-failures-dont-put-zombies-on-life-support/2146855/

Macroeconomic crises are an important reason behind Public-Private Partnership (PPP) project failures. A World Bank paper (Harris and Pratap, 2009) finds that the occurrence of a macroeconomic shock increases the likelihood of project cancellation (failure) from less than 5% to more than 8%, controlling for other variables. The Covid-induced macroeconomic shock will likely be similar in its impact on PPP projects, from the demand and the supply side. During the lockdown period in India, there was near total shutdown of road, rail and air traffic, and power consumption was drastically down in March-May 2020; all this has gradually eased from June 2020 onwards. The supply of labour and access to capital was also seriously affected during the lockdown period. Though the pace of recovery is much faster than anticipated (growth rate recovering from -23.9% in Q1FY21 to -7.5% in Q2), it is likely that there would be increased PPP project failures because of Covid in the future. The PPP project failure rate in the developing world, as per the Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) database of the World Bank (ppi.worldbank.org), is below 4%, both by the number of projects and associated investments. As per this database, 292 PPP projects (out of 8,295 projects, or 3.5%) failed in the period 1990 to 2020 in the developing world. In terms of investments, the corresponding numbers were $71 billion out of $1.99 trillion, or 3.6%. This is much below the overall corporate failure rate and is attributed to concerns about service continuity (after all, almost all PPP infrastructure projects carry out erstwhile sovereign functions), possible termination payments, and negative publicity surrounding these perceived failures. [AD OMITTED] In a recent blog, Makhtar Diop, the World Bank’s Vice President for Infrastructure, talks about having used artificial intelligence to gauge Covid’s impact on infrastructure. He finds that, since February 2020, 256 private infrastructure projects in developing countries have been reported cancelled or delayed. For projects already under construction, the number of projects facing disruptions peaked in May and has since been decreasing. But, the sheer number of distressed projects (256) vis-à-vis the total number of cancelled projects (292) since 1990 should be deeply concerning and point to an increased number of cancellations in the near future. From this analysis, it can be safely inferred that India, with the second-highest number of PPP projects and associated investments in the developing world, is also likely to see increased project failures in the wake of Covid.

### 2AC – PDB – CP Alone Fails

#### Perm solves

Graham Plaster, 11-27-2020, "The Three Groups of Civil-Military Relations," No Publication, https://faoajournal.substack.com/p/the-three-groups-of-civil-military

A significant part of the mission of The Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (DISCS) is to conduct educational courses and provide research and other support designed to improve the knowledge and enhance the skills of a wide audience in the field of security cooperation. DISCS students include U.S. military personnel, Department of Defense (DoD) civilians, other U.S. Government agency employees, representatives of the U.S. defense industry, and military and civilian counterparts from foreign governments, Because of DISCS involvement with both civilian and military groups and institutions, as well as the very nature of 21st century security cooperation which extends beyond simple mil-to-mil contact, our instructors and students should have situational awareness of the components of civil-military relations. Understanding the definition of civil-military relations promotes understanding between groups active in the field of security cooperation, and may help in decreasing conflict related to civil-military relations. In this article, I argue that civil-military relations are more than just a naturally occurring by-product of civilian and military interaction. Rather, understanding what comprises civil-military relations in a democracy – even a fledgling one -- involves a deeper appreciation of the role society plays in the civil-military nexus. In addition, I propose that embracing society’s role in civil-military relations can decrease conflicts in civil-military relations.

### 2AC – PDCP – USAID and DOD

#### CP would be done under the plan

USAID, 04-08-2022, "Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation," USAID, https://www.usaid.gov/military

OFFICE OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY COOPERATION Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation. See Link below for text version PDF | text version The Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation (CMC) is part of the Bureau for Conflict, Prevention and Stabilization (CPS) and serves as USAID’s primary point of contact with the Department of Defense (DOD). Our Approach CMC is driven by its goal to align development and defense and leverage the unique capabilities of both partners to achieve better development outcomes in pursuit of U.S. national security goals and national values. Our approach to USAID-DOD coordination is collaborative to ensure development and defense efforts are mutually reinforcing and not duplicative. Our Work USAID and the Department of Defense have been partners since the 1960s. We work together to align policies, planning and programming, and learning and outreach to advance U.S. foreign policy. CMC maintains steady communication and synchronization of efforts with the DOD through: Personnel Exchange: USAID coordinates with DOD with a team of foreign service, civil service, active-duty military and technical professionals. This allows access and transparency between both agencies on policy, planning, outreach and education. Senior foreign service officers sit at six unified combatant commands (U.S. Africa Command(link is external), U.S. Central Command(link is external), U.S. European Command(link is external), U.S. Indo-Pacific Command(link is external), U.S. Special Operations Command(link is external), U.S. Southern Command(link is external)) and at the Pentagon, to inform and advise DOD in pursuit of better development outcomes and promote cooperation, where appropriate. At USAID, military personnel representing the commands inform USAID on DOD activities with development interests and also ensure access to all levels of DOD leadership. USAID also hosts military liaisons from the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and sponsors U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps fellows. Policy Development: It is USAID policy for all its personnel to cooperate with DOD in support of the Agency’s mission to end extreme poverty and promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing our security and prosperity. CMC facilitates systematic exchange of feedback between USAID and DOD on relevant policies and strategies that affect USAID interests. The CMC policy team regularly convenes a USAID civilian-military cooperation steering committee composed of representatives from USAID regional and technical bureaus to advance cooperation on policy matters.

### 2AC – PDCP – Security Cooperation

#### CMR can be a part of Security Cooperation

Institute for Security Governance, xx-xx-xxxx, "CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS," No Publication, https://instituteforsecuritygovernance.org/documents/113018911/119118404/3.+P309070\_ISG-CMR\_Civil-Military+Relations.pdf/9a6fbe53-77ad-e9df-59ec-39bf0e29da5e?t=1644272504120

ENROLLMENT Courses are conducted as part of the US Government security cooperation efforts. Interested partner nation personnel should contact their government’s international cooperation section, or the relevant US Embassy’s security/military cooperation office for selection processes and enrollment. Interested US citizens may contact ISG to discuss availability. FUNDING Educational programs are primarily implemented through Title 22 authorized programs (International Military Education and Training, Foreign Military Sales, Peacekeeping Operations) and various Title 10 authorized programs such as the Maritime Security Initiative (MSI) and Regional Defense Combating Terrorism and Irregular Warfare Fellowship Program (RDFP). The Institute for Security Governance – situated within the Defense Security Cooperation University’s (DSCU) International School of Education and Advising (ISEA) – is the Department of Defense’s Center of Excellence for Institutional Capacity Building (ICB). As a component of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), and one of its primary international Security Cooperation schoolhouses, ISG is charged with building partner institutional capacity and capability through tailored advising, education, and professional development programs grounded in American values and approaches.

### 2AC – PDCP – MOUs

#### MoUs can help facilitate understanding between private and public entities

U.S. Department of Defense, 02-26-2021, "United States Department of Defense Signs Memorandum of Understanding for Defense Cooperat," https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2517911/united-states-department-of-defense-signs-memorandum-of-understanding-for-defen/

The United States Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Dr. Mara Karlin, and the Minister of Defence of the Republic of North Macedonia, Radmila Shekerinska, co-signed a Memorandum of Understanding to facilitate defense cooperation today. The MoU highlights current avenues of bilateral cooperation and signals the intent to build on the strategic relationship by promoting joint training and exercises, enhancing counterterrorism capabilities, increasing professional military education and exchange opportunities, and improving interoperability. The signing was followed by a phone call where Karlin and Shekerinska discussed the upcoming one-year anniversary of North Macedonia’s accession to NATO and opportunities to further strengthen the partnership.

### 2AC – Solvency – No Compliance

#### Private businesses will not comply with regulations

Jordan, ND, "Public vs. Private: Compliance," Bid Lab, https://www.thebidlab.com/learning-center/public-vs-private-compliance/

Public Sector Procurement For any business vying for public contracts, compliance is everything. In order to bid on public contracts, certain requirements must be met in accordance with government policy. And, if that business is not in adherence to those rules, the bid is “non-compliant” and the firm is no longer a viable option for award. One benefit of opting to bid in the public sector is that agencies have their regulations available to the public. So when businesses are seeking to contract with a government agency, they have the opportunity to vet their regulations and requirements first. There are instances in which a business finds they’re not compliant with a requirement. In that case, they have the opportunity to pursue that compliance requirement(s) prior to bidding on that agency’s RFP. (For example, to bid on a contract to serve as the sanitation company for Utah’s public schools, ABC agency may need to first be certified by the state of Utah.) However, it’s also important to note that there are oftentimes instances where there’s not enough time before an RFP’s deadline to pursue a number of compliance requirements. This is why it’s always important to start bids as close to their release date and also to keep your certifications up-to-date at all times. To provide a level and competitive playing field, federal regulations mandate that all public agencies post their RFPs publicly. At a minimum, RFPs will include: a description of the government’s requirement(s), terms and conditions that are applicable to that contract, vendor requirements for responding to the RFP, and scoring criteria that the issuing agency will utilize in its evaluation process. As a firm with a foot planted on either side of the procurement process, The Bid Lab can tell you firsthand that procurement teams very well may review proposals for compliance before reading a single word in the response. Why? To save time and to help eliminate bids prior to completing the substantive review. For bidders, being compliant with that agency allows your business to make it “through the front door”. Then, procurement teams can evaluate your business on merits per their evaluation criteria to determine the winning bid. Unfortunately, agencies don’t provide an opportunity to submit forms or supplemental information after the submission deadline passes. So, your business should verify adherence to compliance requirements prior to completing the remainder of the proposal. Private Sector Procurement In the public sector, “compliance” is mostly defined by the procuring business. (We’ll discuss mostly in the next section.) In the private sector, procuring businesses usually don’t need to comply with the same regulations set by governing agencies. Compliance rules are defined in-house per what that business’s expectations are for their project. Because of this, companies may issue an RFP with a vendor already in mind for their project. Unlike public sector procurement, this isn’t an illegal act. For this reason, responding businesses should know who their competitors are and what they claim their competitive advantage(s) to be. In this case, you’ll be able to recognize if the procuring company prepared the RFP with the intention of working with a competitor. More and more, especially due to increasing environmental movements, private companies are making internal compliance regulations available to the public. By doing this, the public is able to track their supply chain to verify that the company is complying with its own statements, as a form of public trust. For instance, the public can view clothing brand Patagonia’s social, sustainability and environmental programs right on their website. Furthermore, if a business would like to do business with Patagonia, they can visit the company’s available guiding principles to learn how they make decisions to operate business around the globe. We suggest always knowing your potential customer, their policies and backgrounds prior to investing time in doing business with them. And, many like Patagonia will be happy to share their compliance rules with you first, if those rules will determine who they will do business with. Your RFP will not only be compliant, but will also check all of the reviewer’s boxes by reading How to Ensure RFP Compliance. Finally, since companies mostly define their compliance, the rules may be more lax when it comes to reviewing bids. Procuring companies may overlook deviations from the question. They also have the opportunity to ask the bidder to clarify their response after the fact. As in the Patagonia example used above, it might also be possible to ask for extended submission deadlines so your business can meet the compliance requirements first. Depending on the situation, private companies may be more flexible with bidding companies.

### 2AC – Solvency – Civil Military is Bad

#### CMR fails

Gregory D. Foster, 9-1-1997, "Failed Expectations: The Crisis of Civil-Military Relations in America," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/failed-expectations-the-crisis-of-civil-military-relations-in-america/

How much longer will it be before the American people awaken to the realization that we are confronted today by a crisis in civil-military relations? How many more unseemly and embarrassing incidents and abuses of public trust involving the military will it take to make us see that the failings of the military, egregious enough in themselves, are simply the most telltale signs of a larger crisis that has enormous implications for our national security? No single incident of late—not the highly publicized dismissal from the Air Force of Lieutenant Kelly Flinn, or the adultery-related withdrawal of General Joseph Ralston from consideration as the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the multiple charges of sexual misconduct against the sergeant major of the army, or the ongoing series of court-martial trials of army trainers for massive sexual abuse at Aberdeen Proving Ground and Darmstadt, Germany—constitutes a crisis in and of itself. But these events are not isolated aberrations. They are part of a far larger pattern of institutional misbehavior that includes the security and intelligence lapses that produced the Khobar Towers truck bombing in Saudi Arabia, the safety and equipment failures that led to the deaths of the secretary of commerce and 34 others in a plane crash in Croatia, the suicide of a chief of naval operations who faced allegations that he had been wearing unauthorized combat decorations, white supremacist elements in one of our most “elite” combat divisions, the rapes of young girls by U.S. servicemen in Okinawa and Australia, general officers misappropriating military aircraft for personal and family use, the profligate procurement of gold-plated weapon systems that have failed major performance tests, revelations that the Pentagon may have withheld and distorted information dealing both with the exposure of perhaps thousands of soldiers to depleted uranium munitions and chemical agents and with the performance of expensive armaments in the 1991 Persian Gulf war, and countless other breaches of the public trust. At one level, such recurring incidents typify a military institution that (as distinct from the individuals who constitute it) is seriously diseased—characterized not by an ethos of duty, honor, and country, but by parochialism, a steady undercurrent of chest-thumping machismo, and a disturbing degree of self-serving advocacy and duplicity. At a deeper level, these events reflect a breakdown among the three parties to the triad of civil-military relations: the military itself; the civilian officials who ostensibly control the military; and the people, who bear ultimate responsibility under republican rule for overseeing the military’s civilian overseers. It may not be at all clear how—or even whether—to cure the military’s ills. Judging from the feeble response to date of the country’s most senior decisionmakers, both civilian and military, it isn’t even clear that they recognize, much less are willing to admit and deal with, the problem. (Perhaps that is because they are so much the culprits themselves.) The start of a solution, though, must rest with our collective ability as a nation to discover the source of the disease rather than simply acknowledging its most obvious symptoms. And the source of the disease lies deep: in the expectations the three parties involved have of one another and in their uniform failure to measure up. [AD OMITTED] What are these expectations? To the practiced observer, they are obvious. For their part, civilian officials, presidents in particular, expect two things above all else from the military. The first is operational competence—the ability to accomplish assigned missions, whatever they may be. The second is sound advice. Of course, there are no clearly objective bases for determining what constitutes either. Both are inherently subjective and depend ultimately on the powers of discernment possessed by those who make such judgments. An uninformed observer—whether political appointee or average citizen—devoid of military understanding, especially of the strategic ramifications of military affairs, is fundamentally ill-equipped to distinguish a military that is doing well what it should be doing from one that is doing either the right thing badly or the wrong thing satisfactorily. We see and hear much of this today from those in authority who, wishing to establish their bona fides, incessantly mouth the platitudes of militarese—”readiness,” “op tempo,” “warfighting”—without having the first demonstrable clue as to what militaries actually do or ought to do, much less how. G Gregory D. Foster Soundness of advice similarly may have much—or little—to do with how broad (strategic) or narrow (purely military) the advice is, whether it reinforces or runs counter to what its recipients want to hear, or whether it truly determines results that are subject to so many other intervening influences. Success or failure, in other words—whether in policy or operations, whether in Bosnia or Aberdeen Proving Ground, whether concerned with NATO expansion or the treatment of homosexuals—may bear little direct relationship to the soundness of advice that precedes action (or inaction). Beyond expecting operational competence and sound advice, civilian officials give ample evidence that they expect three other things from their uniformed charges. First, they expect generally unquestioning obedience, not merely to legitimate political direction, but to the full range of civilian dictates and desires (however frivolous, ill-conceived, or self-serving). By this line of reasoning, even responsible dissent is considered disobedience. And no task—ushering at the White House, for instance—is considered too inconsequential to direct dutiful military personnel to perform. Second, they expect a measure of political sensitivity that takes the form, if not of outright docility, at least of responsible enough conduct to avoid becoming a political liability. And finally, they expect sufficient affordability not to visibly drain resources from other political priorities. The military, in turn, expects several things from civilian officials generally and presidents specifically. The most important, executive competence, reflects the degree to which civilian decisionmakers demonstrate the cardinal leadership traits of courage, decisiveness, integrity, and vision in sufficient measure to earn the deference the military expects, and is expected, to give. No less, though, does the military seek from its civilian masters clear strategic guidance—an unambiguous articulation of national purpose, direction, and priorities that charts the country’s course into the future. Such guidance, when available, transcends and provides an antidote to the momentary imperatives of expediency that pervade the policy process. It also establishes a rational basis for allocating national resources, preventing constant crisis, determining military requirements, and justifying the use or nonuse of the military under particular circumstances. It thereby assures the military and the public that those in charge know what they are doing, understand the complexities of the world around them, and are motivated by something more consequential than self-interest. Executive competence and clear strategic guidance represent the high end of the military’s expectations of civilian officials and are only rarely delivered. Politics doesn’t ensure competence in actual governing—as many in office regularly demonstrate. Moreover, politicians typically show little inclination, even if they are able, to produce the sort of specific blueprint for action that opponents could use to hold them accountable for their performance. Accordingly, the military generally is content to limit its expectations of civilian officials to two minimal obligations. The first is appreciation and support—if not understanding—of the military’s purposes and uses, its capabilities and limitations, its needs and concerns, and its value to society. The second is sufficient political acumen to get things done, properly and effectively, in the messy, frustratingly pluralistic worlds of domestic and international politics. The military’s expectation that civilian officials show appreciation and support is, in a deeper sense, a desire that the civilians who command its allegiance display enough reciprocal loyalty and familiarity with military affairs to give them empathetic license for exercising the martial prerogatives of the state. And if the military, socialized as it is to prize order and efficiency, is rightly to stay out of politics—at least of the low, partisan variety—the least politicians can do is to practice the requisite statesmanship to make the system work the way civic indoctrination has convinced us it can and should. The Military and the People No less telling in their impact on the attitudes, comportment, and performance of the armed forces are the military’s expectations of the people. Though hoping for true appreciation, the military expects the support of the citizenry—if only as psychological recompense for the sacrifices the military sees itself making—but seems willing to accept mere noninterference in its professional affairs as a minimal reflection of public trust. The military also seems to expect civic commitment and public order from the people as essential signs of the public’s willingness to meet the obligations of citizenship (preferably of the compliant, deferential kind). The people seem to share with civilian officials the expectation that the military provide operational competence and sound advice—although the public’s powers of discernment and judgment, as well as the concomitant good-faith willingness to forsake the rights to know about and speak out on allegedly sensitive national security matters, vary widely. Thus given to more-or-less blind trust in those who profess to serve them, the people therefore also implicitly ask that their military maintain strict political neutrality—distancing itself from partisan politics, staying out of domestic affairs—and that military personnel conform to the highest standards of ethical and legal conduct, even if the international environment in which they may have to operate is the Hobbesian jungle realists tell us it is and must be. Civilian Leaders and the People What is not so clear is what civilian officials and the people expect of one another and, moreover, where Congress fits in the equation—whether as extension and voice of the people, as representative of an elitist political class that consorts with executive branch officials over the heads of the people, or as an independent force with its own agenda, perspective, and expertise. One would like to think that the people (including Congress) expect civilian officials to demonstrate executive competence, provide clear strategic guidance, and serve the public interest unconditionally; and that civilian officials, in turn, expect active, knowledgeable civic participation for the common good from the people. A more cynical view, tempered by experience, suggests that what both parties ought to seek from the other is quite the opposite of what they actually do expect or want. Today precious few of the mutual expectations the three parties to the civil-military relationship have of one another are being met. From these failed expectations flows the crisis that now afflicts us. Ideally the military would be a useful, usable instrument of national power that facilitates the attainment of the country’s strategic goals, as well as a socially, politically, and economically responsible institution that contributes to the preservation and functioning of civil society. Civilian authorities would establish definitive strategic purpose and direction for the country, effectively manage events and circumstances, and exercise responsible military oversight. The people would be civically engaged and employ reasoned judgment to rigorously oversee the military’s overseers. Reality has fallen well short of this ideal. Civilian officials, increasingly devoid of firsthand or even derivative military experience (a general portent of the future that has been especially pronounced in the Clinton administration), have shown commensurately little faculty for critical discernment in military matters. Having further been consistently less than adroit in the larger conduct of international affairs, they have failed to engender the minimal credibility necessary to compensate for their military illiteracy. Instead they have feigned understanding and support—first, by invariably deferring to established military practices and preferences; second, by shamelessly invoking insider rhetoric, not only to mask their substantive shortcomings, but also to counter prospective criticism and to ingratiate themselves with potentially restive military elements. At the same time, under the guise of urgency and national self-defense, these civilian officials have perpetuated the practice common to all recent presidencies of repeatedly circumventing—or at least outmaneuvering—Congress in committing U.S. troops abroad. Bosnia, and the accompanying promise—deceitful and unfulfilled—to pull U.S. troops out within a year of their deployment, is but the most glaring recent example. The result has been a progressive, largely subliminal diminution of effective civilian control of the military. The military—parochial to a fault, insatiably greedy for resources and the expensive appurtenances of its craft, disturbingly politicized at the top, and beset by a largely unrecognized but nonetheless real and pervasive civic illiteracy within its own ranks—has made the most of its practiced bureaucratic and political survival skills. While ostensibly accepting a variety of nontraditional assignments that its core true believers consider extraneous and burdensome—peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and the like—and while zealously trumpeting itself as the revolutionary vanguard for a new age of third-wave, fourth-generation cyberwar, the military has remained mired in a hidebound conception of war and self whose central tenets are only too familiar: war is inevitable; peace, never but a temporary respite, is a function of one’s readiness for war; war is traditional combat; victory in war goes to the party most proficient in the application of violence; the military exists solely to prepare for and wage war; the profession of arms therefore occupies privileged standing and subscribes to a superior ethos which should be immune from the meddling scrutiny of unworthy amateurs. Such beliefs, deeply ingrained in the thinking of uniformed professionals and their most ardent acolytes (including more than a few on Capitol Hill), have led the military to continue preparing, as always, for the wars of the past; to deny the relevance of—and therefore to be generally unprepared for—the many contemporary contingencies that do not conform to the traditional model of war; and, accordingly, to give experience-impaired civilian officials little strategic maneuver room in responding to emergent crises between the equally unpalatable options of inaction and failure. These same beliefs, because they reflect something deeper about the types of individuals the institution attracts and rewards in fulfilling its sense of mission and self, also have contributed materially to the military’s incessant incident proneness. Such incidents constitute a form of collective institutional disobedience apparently too subtle for most of us to recognize for what it is—the outgrowth of an institution that has lost its identity, that no longer has confidence in or respect for those it is supposed to serve. The people, finally—increasingly disenchanted, cynical, and alienated, and captive still of the Cold War mentality that convinced them they endanger the republic by knowing too much about or questioning the methods or motives of their military and its civilian masters—evince varying degrees of apathy, hostility, and distrust, all of which undermine national will, societal civility, and the very life of democracy itself. Congress, in turn, far from fulfilling the republican ideal, has generally set itself above the people and repeatedly shown its cultivated incapacity as a deliberative body, as an effective check on presidential excess, and as a representative voice for popular sovereignty. In their totality, these conditions call to mind the facetious Cold War aphorism that under communism the workers pretend to work, and the state pretends to pay them. Similarly might it be said that under post Cold War American democracy, civilians pretend to control the military, and the military pretends to be controlled.

### 2AC – UQ – Squo Solves

#### NATO already holds talks with private companies – prefer more recent ev

Nato, 11-25-2020, "NATO-Private Sector Dialogues focus on NATO 2030 initiative," NATO, <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_184601.htm>

(1) The future of warfare and the role of new and emerging technologies The first webinar took place on 25 November 2020. As the inaugural event in the series, it gave a preview of upcoming topics and focused on the future of warfare and the role of new and emerging technologies. Major topics of discussion included artificial intelligence (AI) and big data, AI in warfare, bridging the knowledge and capability gap around AI-automated systems between the public and private sectors, differences in regulatory frameworks across the Alliance and opportunities for defence investment in AI tools, among others. In addition to AI, emerging technologies like hypersonic weapons, quantum and nanotechnologies and autonomous systems were also on the agenda. Participants also discussed the vital importance of cooperation between NATO and the private sector to achieve NATO 2030 objectives, including public-private partnerships with large corporate actors as well as small and medium enterprises. The webinar also included a discussion on innovation ecosystems and venture capital’s role in Allied defence and security, and how NATO and Allies can work to ensure safe financing for start-ups that act as key hubs of creativity in the race to implement and adopt new technologies. (2) Potential private sector contributions to Alliance security In the second webinar, on 21 January 2021, GLOBSEC facilitated a dialogue between NATO and various business leaders on ways in which the private sector could contribute to Alliance security. Throughout the exchange, participants pointed out several potential fields for increased cooperation with NATO on Alliance security. They highlighted in particular that the private sector’s extensive pool of data and expertise could help enhance the Alliance’s situational awareness. They also stressed the role that businesses can and must play to improve the resilience of critical infrastructure, which is often at least partially privately run. The participating industry leaders also called on the public sector to close regulatory loopholes on private investment in order to make supply chains more transparent and emphasised the need for public support to boost innovation. (3) Sustainable defence innovation and climate change On 11 February 2021, the third webinar focused on sustainable defence innovation and its contribution to the fight against climate change. Both NATO and the private sector recognise the ways in which climate change affects security and defence. Indeed, the participating industry leaders stressed that climate change will soon impact most policy areas and concerns in one way or another. In this light, participants underlined the importance of climate foresight and called for greater transatlantic coordination on policy and technological innovation in order to address emerging challenges early on, including as part of efforts to mitigate climate change. (4) Geopolitical competition in the information landscape The fourth webinar, held on 25 February 2021, brought together various private sector leaders to exchange views with NATO on geopolitical competition in the information landscape. The participating private sector representatives recognised that the information landscape is becoming ever more complex and contested, especially in the context of changing geopolitical realities. In this light, they discussed various concrete challenges to improved governance in the information space. The participants highlighted in particular the need for a coordinated transatlantic approach to online regulation and increased public-private cooperation on threat analysis. They stressed that the private sector, including small and medium enterprises, has access to extensive data that can help inform public sector responses to threats in the information space. They also underlined the importance of wider public outreach to promote media literacy and data protection across the transatlantic space. (5) Ethical deployment and governance of new technologies On 25 March 2021, the fifth webinar was based around the theme of transatlantic cooperation on the ethical deployment and governance of emerging technologies. The discussion centred on the need to improve regulation and fill regulatory gaps to ensure the ethical development of emerging technologies. Participants highlighted in particular the role that NATO could play to coordinate and advance the development of common tech norms. The private sector, they suggested, could support such efforts with its technological and industry expertise. The dialogue explored a number of concrete ethical and legal challenges of emerging technologies in the fields of both kinetic and non-kinetic warfare. As a general theme, industry leaders called for the development of more elaborate and up-to-date legal frameworks to reduce uncertainties and tackle potential ethical issues early on. (6) Security of critical infrastructure and supply chains On 22 April 2021, GLOBSEC facilitated the sixth and final webinar between NATO and private sector representatives, focused on critical infrastructure and the security of supply chains. Critical infrastructure and supply chains have become increasingly complex, global and interconnected. The participating industry leaders recognised that this makes it more complicated to address vulnerabilities and discussed a broad range of existing and emerging challenges. Noting the private sector’s focus on cost minimisation, participants stressed in particular the need for businesses to achieve a balance between an appropriate level of security and costs. The public sector, they suggested, could facilitate this effort by further harmonising regulatory systems and facilitating exchanges between industries in the transatlantic space.